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Abstract
This paper explores the stability properties of the steady state in the stan-
dardtwo-sectorrealbusinesscyclemodelwithasector-speci￿cexternality
in the capital-producing sector. When the steady state is stable then equi-
libriumisindeterminateandstablesunspotsarepossible. We￿ndthatcap-
ital adjustment costs of any size preclude stable sunspots for every empir-
ically plausible speci￿cation of the model parameters. More speci￿cally,
we show that when capital adjustment costs of any size are considered,
a necessary condition for the existence of stable sunspots is an upward-
sloping labor demand curve in the capital-producing sector, which in turn
requires an implausibly strong externality. This result contrasts sharply
with the standard result that when we abstract from capital adjustment
costs, stable sunspots occur in the two-sector model for a wide range of
plausible parameter values.
Keywords: capital adjustment costs; determinacy; indeterminacy; sector-
speci￿c externality; sunspots.
JEL classi￿cation: E0; E3.3
1 Introduction
It is well known that the steady state of one-sector growth model is unique
and saddle-path stable and that the equilibrium paths near to the steady
state are locally unique. We will summarize these properties by the term
￿determinacy￿. Even though these properties are typically considered
standard, this model may have completely di￿erent properties when ex-
ternalities are considered: the unique steady state may be stable, which
means that a continuum of equilibrium paths converge to the steady and
that the equilibrium near the steady state is indeterminate. In this case,
changes in non-fundamental variables, usually called sunspots, can select
the equilibrium path. We will summarize these properties by the term
￿stable sunspots￿.1 Since both determinacy and stable sunspots are the-
oretically possible, the natural question to ask is which of the two will
prevail for empirically plausible speci￿cations of the parameters of the
model economy, in particular, for the value of the externality. The goal of
the present paper is to answer this question for real business cycle versions
of the model, which abstract from steady state growth.
The literature on stable sunspots in real business cycle models can be
divided into two broad groups. One group of papers studies one-sector
versions of the real business cycle model and ￿nds that stability requires
strong externalities that are empirically implausible; see e.g. Benhabib and
Farmer (1994), Farmer and Guo (1994), and Gali (1994). A second group
ofpapersshowsthatwhentherearesector-speci￿cexternalitiesinthetwo-
sector versions of the real business cycle model, the steady state can be
stable for mild values of the externality that are empirically plausible; see
e.g. Benhabib and Farmer (1996), Perli (1998), Weder (1998), Harrison
(2000), and Weder (2000). The di￿erence between these two strands of re-
sults comes from two of the di￿erent channels through which sunspots can
a￿ect the dynamic behavior of the model economies. The ￿rst one of these
channels is the labor channel. It works through self-ful￿lling changes in
labor demand and can operate in both the one- and the two-sector model
providing the labor demand curve slopes upwards. This requires implausi-
bly strong externalities and has economic implications that are awkward;
see Aiyagari (1995). The second channel is the capital channel and it
operates through self-ful￿lling changes in the allocation of capital across
sectors and operates only in the two-sector model. The capital channel
1Classical contributions to the literature on sunspots include Azariadis (1981), Cass
and Shell (1983), Kehoe and Levine (1985), Woodford (1991), and Howitt and McAfee
(1992). A review of the literature on sunspots in the neoclassical growth model is Ben-
habib and Farmer (1999).4
relies on capital gains, which can occur for mild sector-speci￿c externali-
ties that are empirically plausible and do not make the labor demand curve
upward sloping.2
The project of this paper is to explore the robustness of the capital
channel. We are motivated by the conjecture that the capital channel only
functions as described in the literature if one abstracts from the costs of
changing the allocation of capital across the two sectors. In order to prove
this conjecture, we consider capital adjustment costs in a standard, two-
sector real business cycle model with a sector-speci￿c externality in the
capital-producing sector. This modi￿cation of the standard model can be
justi￿ed by the substantial empirical evidence on the existence of adjust-
ment costs; see e.g. Hammermesh and Pfann (1996) for a review of this
evidence. Here we employ the speci￿cation proposed by Hu￿man and
Wynne (1999), which drastically improves the quantitative performance
of the two-sector real business cycle model.
We obtain two results. First, we show that capital adjustment costs
of any size shut down the capital channel and preclude the existence of
stable sunspots for a wide range of model parameters that includes every
empirically plausible speci￿cation. Speci￿cally, we ￿nd that a necessary
condition for stable sunspots is that the externality is so strong that the
labor demand curve of the capital-producing sector slopes upward. In
other words, if one considers capital adjustment costs of any size, then the
di￿erence between the stability properties of the one- and the two-sector
real business cycle model disappears. Second, given a benchmark cali-
bration of our model, we show that the unique steady state is saddle-path
stableforeveryempiricallyplausiblevalueoftheexternalityinthecapital-
producing sector. In other words, given the benchmark calibration, we ￿nd
not only hat stable sunspots are impossible but also that determinacy must
occur. We show that this second result is robust to small changes in the
calibrated model parameters.
The results of this paper are relevant for several reasons. To begin
with, they contribute to the debate about whether or not optimal govern-
ment policy should try to stabilize business cycles. In particular, if there
are stable sunspots, then they can generate business cycles. This type of
business cycles is ine￿cient and it has been argued that they should be
stabilized. In contrast, if there is determinacy, then business cycles require
stochastic shocks to total factor productivity or some other fundamental
variable. This second type of business cycles is e￿cient and it has been
2For di￿erent versions of the neoclassical growth model, Boldrin and Rustichini
(1994) and Benhabib, Meng and Nishimura (2000) ￿nd the same di ￿erence: indeter-
minacy is easier to obtain in two- than in one-sector versions.5
argued that they should not be stabilized. 3 Second, there has been a re-
newed, recent interest in two-sector real business cycle models; see for
example Fisher (1997), Hu￿man and Wynne (1999), or Boldrin, Chris-
tiano and Fisher (2000). Our results provide a better understanding of the
stability properties of this important class of models. Last, but not least,
this paper contributes to a recent debate about the robustness of multi-
ple and indeterminate equilibria. Even though Adsera and Ray (1998),
Morris and Shin (1998), Karp (1999), Frankel and Pauzner (2000), and
Herrendorf, Valentinyi and Waldmann (2000) studied rather di ￿erent en-
vironments with externalities, they all share a common theme with the
present paper: multiple or indeterminate equilibria may well be a much
less frequent phenomenon than it has previously been thought.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the
economic environment. Section 3 de￿nes the equilibrium, derives the
reduced-form dynamics, and shows that the model has a unique steady
state around which we can linearize the reduced-form dynamics. Section
4 discusses the calibration of the model while Section 5 reports the re-
sults of the stability analysis and the sensitivity analysis. Section 6 o ￿ers
some intuition for our results and points out the related literature. Section
7 concludes the paper. The formal proofs and the results of our sensitivity
analysis can be found in the Appendix.
2 Environment
Time is continuous and runs forever. There is no uncertainty, which sim-
pli￿es matters but in no way a￿ects the stability results derived. The econ-
omy is populated by a continuum of measure one of identical, in￿nitely-
lived households, by a continuum of measure one of identical ￿rms that
own a technology with which a consumption good can be produced, and
by a continuum of measure one of identical ￿rms that own a technology
with which new capital can be produced. The representative household
is endowed with the initial capital stocks, with the property rights for the
representative ￿rm of each sector at time zero, and with time at each point
in time.
There are sector-speci￿c externalities in the capital-producing sector
that are external to the representative ￿rm producing there. Moreover,
installed capital is sector speci￿c and there are capital adjustment costs.
Thus, at each point in time ￿ve commodities are traded: a perishable con-
sumptiongood, anewcapitalgoodsuitablefortheproductionofconsump-
3Of course, in both cases it is optimal to internalize the externalities, if possible.6
tion goods, a new capital good suitable for the production of new capital
goods, working time in the consumption-producing sector, and working
time in the capital-producing sector. All trades take place in sequential
markets, in which the representative household rents capital and time to
the ￿rms and uses the resulting income to buy from them consumption
goods and new capital goods.
We now describe the programmes that are solved by the households
and ￿rms of our model economy. Note that since there are externalities
here we cannot obtain the equilibrium allocation by solving the planner’s
problem but need to solve the decentralized problems.
2.1 Households





e￿￿t[logct + (T ￿ lct ￿ lxt)]dt (1a)
s.t. ct + pctxct + pxtxxt = ￿ct + ￿xt + wctlct + wxtlxt + rctkct + rxtkxt;
(1b)
￿ kct = xct ￿ ￿ckct; (1c)
￿ kxt = xxt ￿ ￿xkxt; (1d)
0 ￿ ct;lct;lxt; xct; xxt; (1e)
T ￿ lct + lxt; (1f)
kc0;kx0;￿ct;￿xt; pct; pxt;wct;wxt;rct;rxt given: (1g)
The notation is as follows: ￿ > 0 is the constant discount rate; ct denotes
the consumption good at time t; the subscripts c and x indicate variables
from the consumption- and the capital-producing sector, so e.g. lct and lxt
are the working times in the two sectors and wct and wxt are the corre-
sponding wages; T > 0 is the time endowment in each period implying
that (T ￿lct ￿lxt) is leisure; xct and xxt represent the new capital goods and
pct and pxt represent their prices; kct and kxt are the capital stocks and rct
and rxt are the real interest rates; ￿c and ￿x 2 [0;1] denote the depreciation
rates and ￿ct and ￿xt denote pro￿ts (which will be zero in equilibrium).
Note that in each period, the contemporaneous consumption good is taken
to be the numeraire.
Several features of the representative household’s programme deserve
comment. First, the use of logarithmic utility in consumption implies not
only analytical simplicity but also that the stability properties of the model
become independent of whether or not there are increasing returns in the7
consumption-producing sector; see Harrison and Weder (1999) and Harri-
son (2000). Thus, our assumption of constant returns in the consumption-
producing sector has no importance for the stability analysis. Second, the
linearity of the utility in leisure results in an in￿nite wage elasticity of
labor supply. Since it is typically harder to get saddle-path stability the
higher the labor supply elasticity, this makes our results applicable for all
labor supply elasticities.4 Third, it is worth stressing that xct and xxt are re-
stricted to be non-negative because capital is assumed to be sector-speci￿c
here. Consequently, the only way in which the capital stock of a sector can
be reduced is by not replacing depreciated capital.
Denoting the current value multipliers by ￿ct and ￿xt, the ￿rst-order







ct = wct = wxt; (2c)
￿ ￿ct ￿ ￿ct(￿c + ￿) ￿
rct
ct
(with equality if xct > 0); (2d)
￿ ￿xt ￿ ￿xt(￿x + ￿) ￿
rxt
ct
(with equality if xxt > 0); (2e)
lim
t!1
(￿ctkct + ￿xtkxt) ￿ 0: (2f)











Consistent with the evidence reported by Basu and Fernald (1997), we as-
sume that there are constant returns in the consumption-producing sector.
The representative ￿rm of the consumption-producing sector solves:
max
ct;kct;lct
￿ct ￿ ct ￿ rctkct ￿ wctlct (3a)
s.t. ct = ka
ctl1￿a
ct ; (3b)
ct;lct;kct ￿ 0; (3c)
wct;rct given: (3d)
4An economic justi￿cations for linear utility in leisure is the lottery argument put
forth by Hansen (1985).8




wct = (1 ￿ a)ka
ctl￿a
ct : (4b)
The representative ￿rm of the capital-producing sector solves:
max
xxt;xct;lxt;kxt
￿xt ￿ pxtxxt + pctxct ￿ rxtkxt ￿ wxtlxt (5a)
s.t. [￿x
￿







xxt; xct;kxt;lxt ￿ 0; (5c)
Bt; pxt; pct;rxt;wxt given; (5d)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) and ￿ > 1 are constants. Before we will discuss the
roles played by Bt, ￿, and ￿, we derive the ￿rst-order conditions of (5).
Denoting the multiplier attached to (5b) by ￿t, the ￿rst-order conditions















￿ (with equality if xct > 0); (6c)








￿ (with equality if xxt > 0): (6d)
Note that if ￿ > 1 the optimal investments xct and xxt are interior, xct > 0
and xxt > 0. Thus, we can restrict attention to interior solutions for which
the ￿rst-order conditions (6c) and (6d) hold with equality. 5
Theleft-handsideofconstraint(5b)togetherwiththesector-speci￿city
of capital implies the existence of capital adjustment costs. There are sev-
eral reasons to consider adjustment costs in real business cycle models.
First, there is substantial microevidence that ￿rms’ adjustment to stochas-
tic disturbances exceeds by far the length of one year, and hence the max-
imal length of a period in real business cycle models [Hammermesh and
Pfann (1996)]. For this reason, models of ￿rms’ investment behavior typ-
ically feature convex costs of changing the capital stock; see Abel (1990).
5To see the interiority suppose to the contrary that ￿ > 1 and e.g. that xct = 0.
If xct = 0, the ￿rst-order condition (6c) implies that pct ￿ 0, and thus pct = 0. The
household’s ￿rst-order condition (2a) then shows that ￿ct = 0 too. Furthermore, the
household’s ￿rst-order condition (2d) immediately gives that ￿￿ct < 0. Since ￿ct is zero
already it must become negative, which is a contradiction.9
Second, multi-sector business cycle models with costless adjustment have
counterfactual properties in that consumption, aggregate labor productiv-
ity, labor productivity in the consumption-producing sector, and invest-
ment in the capital-producing sector are all countercyclical. Hu ￿man and
Wynne (1999) show that all of these variables become procyclical when
the above speci￿cation of capital adjustment costs is introduced into two-
sector real business cycle model that is identical to the one used here ex-
cept for the fact that it has no externalities. 6
Capital adjustment costs a￿ect the equilibrium allocation by a￿ecting
the curvature of the production possibility frontier. Here we capture this
e￿ect by using the simplest CES functional form with only two param-
eters. This speci￿cation has been fairly popular in the literature on ad-
justment costs; see, among others, Fisher (1997) and Hu ￿man and Wynne
(1999). The weight parameter ￿ 2 (0;1) can be thought of capturing a
choice of units. We will show below that it will not a￿ect the stability
properties. The curvature parameter ￿ > 1 can be thought of as intro-
ducing a cost of changing the composition of the output of new capital
goods.7 We interpret this CES functional form as a local approximation
at the steady state. While it is clearly inappropriate for other purposes,
there are several reasons why it serves us well here. First, it gives rise to
a concave (to the origin) production possibility frontier in ( xct; xxt) space,
and so it generates the curvature to which any type of capital adjustment
costs would give rise.8 Second, it is homogeneous of degree one, implying
that there are constant returns from all ￿rms’ perspectives. Consequently,
equilibrium pro￿ts will be zero in both sectors, ￿ct = ￿xt = 0, and can
be suppressed from now on.9 Third, as demonstrated by Hu￿man and
Wynne, the two parameters ￿ and ￿ can be calibrated.
There is empirical evidence for the presence of positive externalities
in manufacturing durables [Basu and Fernald (1997)]. Consistent with it,






where ￿ 2 [0;(1 ￿ b)=b). Substituting (7a) back into the capital-producing
6Fisher(1997)madearelatedpointforamodelwithahouseholdandamarketsector.
7Recall that installed capital is assumed to be sector speci￿c; otherwise part of the
capital adjustment costs could be avoided by reallocating capital across sectors.
8Below we will demonstrate this for other standard forms of capital adjustment costs.
9Note that zero pro￿ts are consistent with the evidence that there are no signi￿cant
pure pro￿ts.10






where ￿1 ￿ (1 + ￿)b and ￿2 ￿ (1 + ￿)(1 ￿ b).
We end this section with some remarks on the way in which exter-
nalities are introduced here. First, as is standard the externality is not
taken into account by the ￿rms operating in the capital-producing sector.
For this reason, a competitive equilibrium exists and the capital and labor
shares in total output of the capital-producing sector are the usual ones:
rxtkxt=kt = b and wxtlxt=kt = 1 ￿ b. Second, the upper bound (1 ￿ b)=b on
￿ is imposed to exclude the possibility of endogenous growth and guaran-
tee stationarity. For plausible parameter values it will never be binding.
Third, we assume the externality ￿ to be the same on capital and labor in
the capital-producing sector. The main reason is that separate estimates
for the strength of the increasing returns do not exist. The results of Harri-
son and Weder (1999) suggest that imposing this constraint does not a ￿ect
the stability properties in an important way.
3 Equilibrium Dynamics
De￿nition 1 (Competitive equilibrium) A competitive equilibrium are
positive, initialcapitalstockskc0 andkx0, prices fwct;wxt;rct;rxt; pct; pxtg1
t=0,
an allocation flct;lxt; xct, xxt;ctg1
t=0, fkct;kxtg1
t>0, and a path fBtg1
t=0 such that:








t=0 solves the problem of the representa-
tive ￿rm of the consumption-producing sector, (3);
(iii) given fBt; pxt; pct;wxt;rxtg1
t=0, fxxt; xct;lxt;kxtg1
t=0 solves the problem
of the representative ￿rm of the capital-producing sector, (5);
(iv) Bt is determined consistently, that is, (7a) holds.
Note that since we have two sectors here, market clearing is automatically
satis￿ed when the ￿rms’ production constraints are satis￿ed. Thus, we do
not need to specify an economy-wide resource constraint.
The reduced-form equilibrium dynamics must contain the two states
of the model, kct and kxt, and two controls. We use ￿ct and ￿xt as the
controls. The next proposition shows that the reduced-form dynamics can
be represented in terms of kct;kxt;￿ct;￿xt.11
Proposition 1 (Reduced-form dynamics) Inequilibrium, allendogenous
variables are functions of kct;kxt;￿ct;￿xt. The reduced-form dynamics of
kct;kxt;￿ct;￿xt can be represented by:








































+ (1 ￿ ￿)
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Proof. See the Appendix A.
Proposition 2 (Existence and uniqueness of steady state) There is a
unique steady state, (kc;kx;￿c;￿x), in which all variables are constant.
Proof. See the Appendix B.
To study the dynamic properties of our economy close to the steady
state, we linearize the reduced-form dynamics around it. Indicating vari-
ables in steady state by dropping the time subscript, the result can be writ-
ten as:
2
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: (9)12
It is well-known that given that our dynamical system has two states
and two controls, the steady state is saddle-path stable if and only if the
matrix in (9) has two stable and two unstable roots, it is stable if and only if
the matrix in (9) has at least three stable roots, and it is unstable if and only
if the matrix in (9) has at least three unstable roots. 10 If the steady state
is saddle-path stable then the steady state equilibrium is determinate, that
is, given any pair (kc0;kx0) close to (kc;kx) there is a unique pair (￿c0;￿x0)
such that starting from (kc0;kx0;￿c0;￿x0) the economy converges to the
steady state. If the steady state is stable, then the steady state equilibrium
is indeterminate, that is, given any pair of capital stocks close to the steady
state pair there exists a continuum of pairs of shadow prices such that the
economy converges to the steady state. In this case, sunspots can select
the equilibrium. If one assumes that the sunspots follow certain stochastic
processes they can then also generate business cycles.
Note that all we can achieve here are local results close to steady state,
and so we are not able to study the implications of the transversality condi-
tion. Thus, saddle-path stability does not rule out the possibility that there
are pairs (￿ ￿c0; ￿ ￿x0) such that starting from (kc0;kx0; ￿ ￿c0; ￿ ￿x0) the economy
evolves along a dynamic path that does not converge to the steady state
but nonetheless is consistent with the equilibrium conditions. Since busi-
ness cycles are typically understood as small deviations from steady state,
this possibility is not interesting from the point of view of business cycle
research.
4 Benchmark calibration
Except for the increasing returns parameter ￿, we use the parameter values
of Hu￿man and Wynne (1999) for our benchmark calibration. Hu ￿man
and Wynne calibrate a two-sector model similar to our’s to quarterly, post-
war, one-digit US data. The di￿erence to our model is that Hu￿man and
Wynne have constant returns in both sectors. As can be checked from the
above formulas, the choice of ￿ does not a￿ect the calibration of any other
parameter. Hu￿man and Wynne count a sector as a capital-producing sec-
tor if more than ￿fty percent of its output is capital goods or intermediate
goods, otherwise it is counted as a consumption-producing sector. This
gives depreciation rates of ￿c = 0:018 and ￿x = 0:020 and labor shares of
a = 0:41 and b = 0:34. Moreover, they set the rate of time preference to
￿ = 0:01.
10A root of the matrix in (9) is called stable if it has a negative real part and unstable
if it has a positive real part.13
There is an issue of how appropriate Hu￿man and Wynne’s ad-hoc
categorization of one-digit sectors as consumption- or capital-producing
sector is. For example, the ￿more-than-￿fty-percent rule￿ implies that all
manufacturing is counted in the capital-producing sector. The reason for
using this rather coarse assignment rule is that although the national in-
come accounts report labor, capital, investment, and depreciation by sec-
tor, they do not give these statistics by consumption or capital goods pro-
duced by each sector. Given that most sectors produce both goods, these
quantities somehow need to be allocated between consumption and capital
production. A second reason for Hu￿man and Wynne’s categorization is
that it is consistent with the existence of capital adjustment costs across,
and not within, sectors. This is more in the spirit of our capital adjustment
costs function. To get an idea of how robust their calibration is to changes
in the categorization, we report the labor shares that result from two al-
ternative ways of proceeding. First, if one disaggregates more and uses
two-digit instead of one-digit industries but the same assignment rule, the
1992 benchmark of the NIPAs implies labor shares in consumption and
capital of 0:39 and 0:29. Second, one could also compute the labor shares
in each sector’s outputs of consumption goods and of investment plus in-
termediate goods and then take the average across sectors. 11 Using the
input-output tables of the NIPA, 1987 benchmark, Chari, Kehoe and Mc-
Grattan (1997) report shares of 0:39 and 0:31. Since these estimates of
share parameters are very close to those of Hu￿man and Wynne, we have
some con￿dence in using their other parameter values. Nonetheless, we
will conduct some sensitivity analysis below.
Hu￿man and Wynne (1999) calibrate the adjustment costs parameters
￿ and ￿ from data on the real and the nominal investment for the two sec-
tors. To see how this can be done, divide (6c) by (6d) (both with equality)


























Using postwar data on real and nominal sectoral investment, Hu ￿man and
Wynne obtain ￿ = 1:1 and ￿ = 1:3, depending on the exact procedure.
11Note that this procedure does not work for assigning a sector’s total investment and
depreciation to its production of consumption and capital goods.14
Given ￿, choosing ￿ is essentially a choice of units and does not a￿ect the
stability properties of the system.12 It is convenient for the derivation of
some of the analytical results below to set ￿ such that the relative price
of both investment goods becomes one in steady state. Using (B.1c) and
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The evidence on increasing returns is mixed. However, it is non-
controversial that Hall’s (1988) initial estimates of ￿ ￿ 0:5 were upwardly
biased. More recent empirical studies have instead come up with estimates
between constant returns and more mild increasing returns up to 0 :3; see
e.g. Bartelsman, Caballero and Lyons (1994), Burnside, Eichenbaum and
Rebelo (1995), or Basu and Fernald (1997). Another piece of evidence
due to Basu and Fernald (1997) is that non-durable manufacturing is es-
timated to have constant returns, whereas durable manufacturing is found
to have increasing returns up to 0:36.
Since it is di￿cult to draw a sharp line between empirically plau-
sible and implausible values for ￿ and ￿, we do not choose a calibra-
tion for these two parameters but report the results for a range of dif-
ferent values. More speci￿cally, we restrict attention to parameter pairs
(￿;￿) 2 (1:000;0:000) ￿ (1:400;0:900) and put a grid of size 0:001 on this
rectangle. Note that we need to be careful with ￿ = 1:000 because the
above ￿rst-order conditions are not de￿ned. We approximate ￿ = 1:000
by ￿ = 1:000000001. Note too that given the calibration of b = 0:34 all in-
creasing returns of ￿ < 1:942 are possible without leading to endogenous
growth. However, since increasing returns up to 1:942 are not of interest
empirically we draw a line at ￿ ￿ 0:9, which allows for much larger values
of ￿ than are typically thought to be realistic.15
Figure 1: Local Stability Results for ￿c = 0:018, ￿x = 0:020, a = 0:41,

































































































































































































































































5.1 Results for the benchmark calibration
Our ￿ndings for the benchmark calibration are reported in Figure 1 and
can be summarized as follows. For all moderate values ￿ 2 (1:000;1:119)
there is a threshold value of increasing returns at which the model’s prop-
erties change from ￿determinate￿ to ￿unstable￿. So, for such parameter
values the steady state cannot be stable and there is no scope at all for
stable sunspots. It should be pointed out that in this case there may exist
unstable sunspots. The reason is that when the steady state is unstable the
eigenvalues are complex for many choices of ￿ and ￿, implying that the
equilibrium path can ￿spiral out o￿ the steady state￿ and end somewhere
other than at the steady state. Since our analysis is local in nature we can-
not say anything about this type of unstable sunspots, except that they are
not interesting from the point of view of business cycle research.
12To see this formally, one needs to substitute the steady state expressions for kc, kx,
￿c, and ￿x, (B.4d), (B.4b), (B.4c), and (B.4a), into the matrix of expression (9). One
can then show that all elements of a given row depend on ￿ through the same factor.
Speci￿cally, these factors are ￿￿1=￿(1￿￿)￿￿1=[￿(1￿￿1)], (1￿￿)￿1=[￿(1￿￿1)], ￿1=￿(1￿￿)￿1=[￿(1￿￿1)],
and (1￿￿)1=[￿(1￿￿1)], respectively. Since the determinant of a matrix is to be multiplied by
a number if all elements of one of its rows are multiplied by that number, the choice of ￿
will not a￿ect the sign of the real parts of the eigenvalues.16
For more sizable capital adjustment costs, ￿ 2 [1:119;1:400], the prop-
erties change from determinacy to stable sunspots at a ￿rst threshold of
increasing returns equal to 0:51 and from stable sunspots to instability at
a second, larger threshold value of ￿, which increases in ￿. Put di￿erently,
for this range of capital adjustment costs, stable sunspots are possible but
they require degrees of increasing returns that are generally considered
implausible. To understand the signi￿cance of the number 0 :51, note that
given that the labor share in the capital-producing sector is 1 ￿ b = 0:66,
the labor demand of the capital-producing sector is upward sloping for
￿ > 0:51. Since the labor supply elasticity is in￿nite here, an upward slop-
ing labor demand curve would imply the stability of the steady state also
in the standard one-sector model [Benhabib and Farmer (1994)].
In sum, given our benchmark calibration, we ￿nd that (i) a necessary
condition for stable sunspots is that the externality is strong enough to
make the labor demand curve of the capital-producing sector upward slop-
ing; (ii) a necessary condition for determinacy is that this labor demand
curve is downward sloping. So, when we consider adjustment costs, stable
sunspots no longer occur through the capital channel but through the la-
bor channel, implying that the stability properties of the two-sector model
with capital adjustment is like that of the one-sector model and unlike that
of the two-sector model without adjustment costs. Another way of putting
this result is that there is a bifurcation at ￿ = 1. We will see in the next
section that this ￿rst result is very robust to changes in the parameter val-
ues.
A second result or our analysis is that given the benchmark calibration
and capital adjustment costs within the range calibrated by Hu￿man and
Wynne, ￿ 2 [1:1;1:3], the steady state is determinate if the increasing
returns do not exceed 0:483. The range ￿ 2 [0;0:483] includes all values
of increasing returns that are usually considered reasonable. So, given ￿ 2
[1:1;1:3], the properties of the benchmark calibration can be summarized
by determinacy for every empirically plausible speci￿cation of ￿.
We also explore the stability properties of our model for the annual
parameter values that Benhabib and Farmer (1996) choose: ￿ = 0:05,
a = b = 0:3, and ￿c = ￿x = 0:1.13 Figure2summarizestheresults: theyare
very similar to those of the benchmark calibration. An interesting detail
to appreciate about the ￿gure is that for ￿ = 1:000000001, the stability
13It should be mentioned that we do not have available a calibration of ￿ to annual
data, and so we will not make any statements about empirically plausible or implausible
values of ￿ for this calibration. While simple intuition suggests that calibrating ￿ to an-
nual data should produce smaller values than calibrating it to quarterly data, it is unclear
how large this e￿ect is quantitatively.17
































































































































































































































































properties change at ￿ = 0:176 from determinacy to instability. Harrison
and Weder (1999, page 13) show that without capital adjustment costs, the
stability properties also change at ￿ > 0:176 to instability. For ￿ < 0:176,
however, they ￿nd determinacy only for ￿ 2 [0;0:064] and stable sunspots
for ￿ 2 (0:064;0:176]. This detail illustrates how arbitrarily small capital
adjustment costs shut down the capital channel. 14
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to explore the robustness of the results found so far we conduct
some sensitivity checks. To begin with, we depart from our benchmark
calibration in the following ways: we keep ￿ ￿xed at 1:000000001 or at
1:1 and vary instead ￿ and one of the other parameters, i.e. a, b, ￿c, ￿x, or
￿. The results are summarized by Figures C.1 to C.6, which can be found
in the Appendix C.
The most important outcome of these sensitivity checks is that our
main result is very robust in that stable sunspots always require ￿ > 0:51
14In terms of the roots, the following happens. The economy with ￿ = 1:000000001
and with sector-speci￿c capital has the roots ￿0:019117659 ￿ 0:485906504i and
0:075639397 ￿ 1489:090568804i. The economy with ￿ = 1 and without sector-speci￿c
capital has the roots ￿0:019117647￿0:485906476i. These numerical results suggest that
the imaginary part of the two unstable roots converges to in￿nity whereas the two stable
roots converge to the roots of the two-dimensional system. Thus, ￿ = 1 is a bifurcation
point.18
Figure 3: Local Stability Results for ￿ = 0:005, a = 0:41, b = 0:17,



















































































































































































































except when we change b. The reason for the quali￿er is obvious: chang-
ing b changes the value of increasing returns that make the capital-produ-
cing sector’s labor demand upwards sloping. Our second result that given
the benchmark calibration and given ￿ 2 [1:1:1:3], determinacy results
for all empirically plausible values of the externality is not as robust as
the previous one. Speci￿cally, if we increase ￿ and ￿x and decrease ￿c
and b su￿ciently, then stable sunspots or instability result. Note that the
common e￿ect of all of these changes is that they decrease the amount of
steady state capital in the capital-producing sector. Finally, note that the
value for a does not a￿ect the stability results. This re￿ects the general
fact that the stability properties of the two-sector model are independent
of the properties of the production function in the consumption sector.
Since we have only explored how the stability properties change as we
change a, b, ￿c, ￿x, or ￿, it is in principle possible that our results would
change if we changed all of them together. To counter this objection,
we conduct a ￿nal robustness check; if according to the previous results
increasing (decreasing) a parameter of our benchmark calibration makes
stable sunspots easier to obtain then we double (halve) the value that this
parameter takes in our benchmark calibration. This produces a fairly unre-
alistic set of parameter values: a = 0:41, b = 0:17, ￿c = 0:036, ￿x = 0:01,19
and ￿ = 0:005.15 The stability results for these parameters are reported
in Figure 3. Again, it turns out that stable sunspots require an upward
sloping labor demand of the capital-producing sector, which is ensured if




The previous section has shown that stable sunspots are much harder to
obtain with capital adjustment costs and sector-speci￿c capital than with-
out these features. Here we seek to develop economic intuition for this
result. We start by demonstrating that as ￿ goes to one, the steady states
of the economies with capital adjustment costs and sector-speci￿c capital
converge to the steady state of the economy without these features. This
means that the explanation for our results cannot be that capital adjustment
costs introduce a discontinuity at the steady state prices and allocation.
Proposition 3 (Existenceanduniquenessofsteadystatefor ￿ = 1) The
economy without capital adjustment costs and sector-speci￿c capital has
a unique steady state, in which all variables are constant.
Proof. See the Appendix D.
Proposition 4 (Convergence of steady states) Suppose that ￿ is chosen
such that pc = px in steady state. As ￿ converges to one from above, the
steady states of the economies with capital adjustment costs and sector-
speci￿c capital indexed by ￿ converge in the supremum norm to that of the
economy without capital adjustment costs and sector-speci￿c capital.
Proof. See the Appendix E.
Proposition 4 also implies that the sector-speci￿city of capital does
not matter for the equilibrium allocation at the steady state. The intuitive
reason is that there is positive depreciation of capital in both sectors, so
at the steady state any desired reduction in capital can be achieved by not
replacing depreciated capital. Note that Christiano (1995) ￿nds a related
result for a discrete time version of the two-sector model: making installed
capital sector-speci￿c for one period does not change at all the stability
properties of the steady state.
15a remains unchanged because its value does not a ￿ect the stability properties.20
We will now argue that the di￿erence in the stability properties of the
economies without and with capital adjustment costs comes from the be-
havior of the relative price between the two capital goods. In particular,
when capital adjustment costs are abstracted from, this relative price is
constant, see (C.1). In contrast, when capital adjustment costs are con-
sidered this relative price changes when the ratio of the two capital goods












In order to explain why changes in pxt=pct make a di￿erence, it is use-
ful to explain ￿rst how stable sunspots can be consistent with equilibrium
for mild sector-speci￿c externalities in the capital-producing sector. This
amounts to describing how the capital works in the two-sector model when
capital adjustment costs are abstracted from. 16 So, suppose that the econ-
omy is on an equilibrium path when a sunspot makes individuals believe in
a temporarily higher return on capital. They will then allocate more capital
to the capital-producing sector today and reverse that decision tomorrow,
which will increase capital output today and decrease it tomorrow. Since
therearesector-speci￿c, positiveexternalitiesinthecapital-producingsec-
tor, the relative price of capital in terms of consumption decreases today
and increases tomorrow. In other words, the initial change in the alloca-
tion of capital produces a capital gain that makes the sunspot self-ful￿lling
and consistent with equilibrium.
When capital adjustment costs of any size are considered, then the rel-
ative price of the two capital goods changes when the two capital stocks
change. To see why this precludes capital gains in equilibrium, note ￿rst
that since installed capital is sector speci￿c the two capital stocks can only
be changed by changing the quantities of the new capital goods that are
invested in the two sectors. Speci￿cally, a temporary increase in the cap-
ital stock of the capital-producing sector requires a temporary increase
in xxt=xct. While there will still be a capital gain on both capital goods
(their relative price in terms of consumption decreases today and increases
tomorrow), it is no longer optimal to collect it by temporarily holding
more capital for the capital-producing sector and less for the consumption-
producing sector. The reason is that, as is evident from expression (13),
pxt=pct is higher today than tomorrow, so xxt is relatively expensive today
and relatively cheap tomorrow. Thus, optimizing households will wish to
collect the capital gain by holding more xct and less xxt today, implying
16The arguments presented here are close to those of Benhabib and Farmer (1999).21
that the initial increase in xxt=xct cannot be consistent with equilibrium.
As a result, the capital channel is not operative when capital adjustment
costs are considered. Note that this e￿ect prevails independent of the size
of the capital adjustment costs.
The intuitive argument just provided suggests that our main result
would go through for all speci￿cations of capital adjustment costs that
have the same qualitative implications for the relative price ratio pxt=pct as
the speci￿cation used so far. It is easy to show this for the case in which
installed capital is sector speci￿c and there are convex costs of changing
the capital stocks, an assumption that is widely made in the literature; see
e.g. Abel and Blanchard (1983) and Ortigueira and Santos (1997). Ex-


















where mc and mx are increasing, non-negative, and convex functions. 17 It
is straightforward to show that the equilibrium relative price of the two
































So, given the assumed properties of mc and mx and given that the installed
capital stocks are the states, a change in xxt=xct a￿ects pxt=pct in the same
way as above.
6.2 Related literature
Our results are related to several existing papers that explore the impli-
cations of capital adjustment costs for the stability properties of dynamic
models. To begin with, Kim (1998) and Wen (1998b) study this issue
in the standard one-sector neoclassical growth model. More speci￿cally,
Kim(1998)demonstratesanalyticallythatconvexcostsofinvestmentraise
17Note that to be consistent with the above model structure we assume that the capital
adjustment costs are paid by the ￿rms that produce the new capital goods. It is well
known that the results would not change if we assumed that the capital adjustment costs
are paid by the owners of capital (here households) or by the ￿rms that actually install
the new capital (here the ￿rms in either sectors); see for example the discussion in Kim
(1998).22
the minimal value of increasing returns for which the steady state becomes
stable and Wen (1998b) identi￿es quantitatively the value of a convex cost
of changing investment that ensures the saddle-path stability of the steady
state of the calibrated model. Another related paper is Matsuyama (1991),
who employs an overlapping generations model with sector-speci￿c ex-
ternalities and sector-speci￿c labor. One of his results is that it is harder
to get equilibrium sunspots the larger are the costs that individuals incur
when they change sector.18 The main di￿erences between these papers
and the present one are: (i) there exist calibrated values for our capital
adjustment costs, and so our results are not only qualitative but also quan-
titative in nature; (ii) we do not need a minimum threshold value of capital
adjustment costs for our main result to hold, rather it holds for any value
of capital adjustment costs. Note that the di￿erence between the results
for the one- and the two-sector model suggests that the labor channel is
much more robust to the introduction of capital adjustment costs than the
capital channel.
Our paper is also related to a recent literature that investigates the ro-
bustness of multiple equilibria. A ￿rst contribution in this spirit is Ad-
sera and Ray (1998). Employing a stripped down-version of Matsuyama
(1991), they show that an arbitrarily small departure from the assumption
of instantaneous payo￿s can introduce a free-riding problem that elimi-
nates multiple equilibria. A second contribution in this spirit is Morris
and Shin (1998), who demonstrate that arbitrary small departures from
the assumption of common knowledge can be su￿cient to eliminate mul-
tiple equilibria in models of speculative currency attacks. 19 Here, we have
shown here that an arbitrary small departure from the assumption of cost-
less adjustments in capital has the same e￿ect in a two-sector real business
model with sector-speci￿c externalities.
7 Conclusion
This paper has explored the conditions under which stable sunspots exist
in the standard two-sector real business cycle model with a sector-speci￿c
externality in the capital-producing sector. We have found that capital ad-
justment costs of any size preclude stable sunspots for every empirically
plausible speci￿cation of the model parameters. More speci￿cally, we
have shown that when capital adjustment costs of any size are considered,
18In this particular model, the costs are captured by the frequency with which individ-
uals can change sector.
19Karp (1999) applies this idea to the model of Matsuyama (1991).23
a necessary condition for the existence of stable sunspots is an upward-
sloping labor demand curve in the capital-producing sector, which in turn
requires implausibly strong externalities. This result contrasts sharply
with the standard result that when we abstract from capital adjustment
costs, stable sunspots occur in the two-sector model for a wide range of
plausible parameter values.
The results of this paper imply that the occurrence of stable sunspots in
the two-sector real business cycle model with sector-speci￿c externalities
is not robust to the introduction of capital adjustment costs. Since we have
argued above that this result is unlikely to depend on the particular fea-
tures of the model version or on the form of the capital adjustment costs
speci￿cation, we are led to conclude that proponents of stable sunspots
will have to demonstrate the plausibility of their point in other versions
of the neoclassical growth model. One possibility is opened by the recent
work of Wen (1998a), who discovers a third channel through which stable
sunspots can occur in real business cycle models, namely, variable capi-
tal utilization. Speci￿cally, it turns out that in a one-sector version of the
real business cycle model with variable capital utilization, stable sunspots
require only mild increasing returns that are empirically defendable. Ex-
ploring the robustness of this third channel is an interesting topic, which
we leave for future research.
Appendix
A Proposition 1
Proof. (1c), (1d), and (2c)￿(2e) imply
￿ kct = xct ￿ ￿ckct; (A.1a)
￿ kxt = xxt ￿ ￿xkxt; (A.1b)
￿ ￿ct = ￿ct
"





￿ ￿xt = ￿xt
"





To represent the economy as a dynamical system in kct, kxt, ￿ct, and ￿xt,
we need to express all endogenous variables, i.e. ( xct, xxt, lct, lxt, rct, rxt,
pct, pxt, wct, wxt), as functions of these four variables.
We start by deriving the prices as functions of the real variables and
the shadow prices. The ￿rst useful fact to notice is that (2c), (3b), and (4b)24
imply that labor in the consumption-producing sector is constant:
lct = 1 ￿ a: (A.2a)
This together with (2c) and (3b) gives a reduced-form for consumption
and both wages:
ct = wct = wxt = c(kct) ￿ (1 ￿ a)1￿aka
ct: (A.2b)
Moreover, dividing (4a) by (4b) and (6a) by (6b) and using (A.2a), we can















Using (A.2b), these two equations can be solved for the real rates of return
on the two capital goods:










on lxt. Finally, combining (2a), (2b), and (A.2b), we obtain reduced form
expressions for the prices of the two investment goods:
pct = pc(kct;￿ct) ￿ (1 ￿ a)1￿a￿ctka
ct; (A.2g)
pxt = px(kct;￿xt) ￿ (1 ￿ a)1￿a￿xtka
ct: (A.2h)
The remaining task is to ￿nd labor in the capital-producing sector and
the two new capital goods as functions of the two capital stocks and the
two shadow prices. The ￿rst step is to write the investment ratio as a
function of the shadow price ratio. Note that (2a) and (2b) imply that













Substituting this into (6c) and (6d), both with equality, one arrives at:
pct = ￿t￿
2













pxt = ￿t(1 ￿ ￿)
2








+ (1 ￿ ￿)
3




Now, from (2a), (2b), and (2c) we know that ￿ct = pct=wxt and ￿xt =
pxt=wxt; using this and (7a) after dividing (A.3b) and (A.3c) by (6b), we
obtain the reduced form for labor in the capital-producing sector:
lxt = lx(kxt;￿ct;￿xt) ￿
8
> > > > > > <
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Next, we derive expressions for each type of investment. Substituting
(7a) and (A.3a) into (5b) gives
xct
2



























+ (1 ￿ ￿)
3








To eliminate lxt from these expressions, we can use (A.3d). After rear-26









































+ (1 ￿ ￿)
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Substituting the above reduced forms for xct, xxt, rct, rxt, pct, and pxt into
(A.1) and rearranging, (8) follows. ￿
B Proposition 2
Proof. Representing variables in steady state by dropping the time index



















+ (1 ￿ ￿)
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+ (1 ￿ ￿)
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5; (B.1c)
which can be solved for the ratio of the shadow value of the capital stocks














Substituting this relationship into equations (8a) and (8b) evaluated at the
steady state and using (8c), we obtain


































To show uniqueness, we derive explicitly kc;￿x;￿c as a function of kx












































Using (B.1d), we obtain
￿x =
ab￿c
(￿ + ￿c)[￿ + ￿x(1 ￿ b)]
k￿1
x (B.4a)





















Combining (B.1d) with (B.4a) yields
￿c =
"










￿ + ￿x(1 ￿ b)
k￿1
x ; (B.4c)28
Finally, the previous equation and (B.2c) together imply
kc =
"







￿ ￿ + ￿x(1 ￿ b)
￿cb
kx; (B.4d)
which proves that the steady state is unique. ￿29
C Sensitivity Analysis























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Proof. For ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 1=2, the economy studied above reduces to the
economy without capital adjustment costs and sector-speci￿c capital. As
a result, we do not need to make many modi￿cations to the above ￿rst-
order conditions. More speci￿cally, since from the households point of
view the only novelty is that investment can now be negative, all equations
in (2) with the exception of (2d) and (2e) are still appropriate. These two
equationshold nowwith equality. Furthermore, there isno di ￿erencefrom
the point of view of the ￿rms of the consumption-producing sector, so (4)
are still the relevant ￿rst-order conditions. Third, the problem of the ￿rms
of the investment sector needs to be modi￿ed: from (6) only (6a) and (6b)
are still relevant, whereas (6c) and (6d) change to




Combining the modi￿ed ￿rst-order conditions with the steady state
condition that all time derivatives are to be zero, it is straightforward to
show that given k the steady state (kc;kx;lc;lx; x;c;rc;rx;wc;wx; p;￿) is
characterized by the following equations:
p = ￿c; (C.2a)
































k = kc + kx; (C.2j)
where ￿1 ￿ (1 + ￿)b, ￿2 ￿ (1 + ￿)(1 ￿ b), ￿ ￿ ￿c = ￿x, and p ￿ pc = px.
To see that there is a unique steady state, we ￿rst reduce (C.2) to a
system of three equations in kc, kx, and ￿, which can be solved uniquely.
It is then easy to determine the remaining steady state variables. To begin33
with, equations (C.2b) and (C.2g) imply lx = 2(1 ￿ b)￿x. Plugging this
into (C.2i) gives total investment in steady state:






Using this together with (C.2a), equations (C.2c), (C.2d), (C.2e), and
(C.2f) can be rewritten as
















These equations can explicitly be solved for kc, kx, and ￿. To see this,




(￿ + ￿c)[￿ + ￿x(1 ￿ b)]
k￿1
x : (C.5)
After substituting this back into (C.4) and solving for kc, kx, and ￿, the
unique steady state turns out to be:
kc = 2
￿ 1



















































Proof. Imposing the steady state conditions and the condition that ￿ is









The equations that characterize the steady state, (B.4a)-(B.4d), become
kc =






























Since lim￿!1 ￿ = 1=2, it is straightforward to show that as ￿ ! 1 each
equation converges to the corresponding equation in (C.6). Since there are
￿nitely many steady state variables, this means that convergence is in the
supremum norm. ￿
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